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Chapter 6 
 
Institutional theory and legislatures 
 
David Judge 
 
How useful is an ‘institutional’ approach to the study of legislatures? The answer 
depends of course upon what type of ‘institutionalism’ is under consideration. 
There are, as Guy Peters points out in the introductory chapter of this 
volume and in his book-length study (1999), several versions of ‘new’ institutional 
theory in current use. Little would be served here, however, in providing 
yet another overview of the main institutional theories. Instead, what needs to 
be noted at this stage is that these diverse approaches are united by the belief 
that ‘institutions matter’, that ‘institutions make a difference’, that institutions 
persist over time, and that the behaviour of individuals is influenced by the 
institutional configurations within which they locate themselves. On the other 
hand, what separates them are different understandings of what an institution 
is, what an institution does, what constitutes institutional design and the facility 
with which institutional change can be brought about. Overall, however, 
institutional theories ‘simply … consider institutions the central component 
of political life’ (Peters, 1999: 150). 
 
The objective of this chapter is to review different institutional approaches 
to the study of legislatures, and to do so by asking three related questions. First, 
how do institutions become institutions? Second, how do institutions organize 
themselves and operate as institutions? In other words, what is entailed in ‘being’ 
an institution? The third question is how well do institutional theories 
explain the ‘real world’ of institutions? The answers to these questions are structured 
around an analysis of three discrete strands of ‘new institutional’ theory. 
This does not mean that each specific question is neatly answered by a single 
approach. Manifestly this is not the case, but in seeking to answer each question 
from the perspective of a particular discrete theory, the analytical differences, 
and the problems associated with each approach, can be highlighted. 
The first strand of theory – ‘institutionalization’ – is reviewed to see how 
well it answers the question of how do institutions become institutions. Without 
giving too much away at this stage, the conclusion is ‘not too well’, given 
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that the phenomenon of institutionalization remains, even after nearly four 
decades of intensive study, under-conceptualized and under-measured. The 
second strand of theory – rational choice – is examined to gauge its utility in 
providing answers to the second question. Here again, despite extensive model 
building and the amassing of empirical data, the capacity of these theories to 
provide adequate explanations of how and why institutions operate in the way 
they do, and how and why institutions change, can be questioned. 
Threaded implicitly throughout the discussion of the institutionalization 
and rational choice approaches is an answer to the third question of how well 
do new institutionalist perspectives deal with the ‘real world’. An analysis of 
‘historical institutionalist’ accounts of the emergence of representative institutions 
is used to provide a more explicit answer. In fact, historical institutionalists 
themselves have no hesitation in proclaiming that their studies address ‘real world 
questions of interest to educated publics’ (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 
697). Yet other institutionalists remain to be convinced that historical institutionalism 
is constructed with sufficient rigour, either in terms of theory or 
methodology, to provide ‘real world’ answers. 
 
While there can be no doubts that ‘new institutionalism’ approaches have 
revitalized the study of institutions generally and reinvigorated the study of 
legislatures specifically, doubts remain as to whether they constitute significant 
increments of understanding upon more traditional and established institutional 
approaches. 
 
Institutional studies of legislatures: neither ‘old’ nor new? 
 
Before reviewing ‘new institutional theory’ it should be noted in preface that a 
variant of ‘institutionalism’ has survived in legislative studies since the 1960s. 
This approach was neither necessarily ‘old’ nor ‘new’ in the senses outlined by 
Peters (1999). ‘Old institutionalism’ has been stereotyped as atheoretical and 
descriptive and concerned excessively with details and formal procedures (John, 
1998: 39; Peters, 1999: 6). Certainly, throughout this period, analyses of the 
House of Commons were open to the charge that they were ‘overdescribed’ 
while remaining ‘under-researched, under-conceptualized and isolationist’ 
(Judge, 1981: 1). 
 
Nonetheless, proto-theories were clearly discernable in legislative research. 
One classic example was provided by the seminal work of Wahlke, Eulau, 
Buchanan and Ferguson (1962). Despite the opening sentence of Wahlke et 
al.’s The Legislative System pronouncing that, ‘[t]he research to be reported did 
not begin with a theory to test nor did it end with one’ (1962: 3), the rest of the 
book is concerned with developing a ‘role-theory model’ of legislators’ actions 
and behaviours. What is particularly noteworthy for present purposes is that 
Wahlke et al. explicitly acknowledge that: 
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the behaviour of legislators is clearly ‘institutional behaviour’ not merely 
aggregated or symbiotic behaviour of individuals. Institutions, it has been said, are 
regularities or uniformities of behaviour. The concept of role associated with a 
position of membership of any institutionalized group refers to precisely those 
behavioural uniformities or regularities which constitute the institution. (1962: 10) 
 
The essential point for Wahlke et al. is that individual actions are located 
within a determinate institutional framework – in this case a legislature. In this 
sense, and in retrospect, their work is ‘compatible with modern forms of neoinstitutionalism’ 
(Searing, 1994: 3; Saalfeld and Müller, 1997: 8). 
 
Correspondingly, a whole host of empirical studies, which loosely conform 
to Peter’s categorization of ‘empirical institutionalism’ have filled the pages of 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, and latterly the Journal of Legislative Studies. While 
essentially empirical, such studies have ‘indwelling … an argument that formal 
structuring of interaction does determine, or at least influence behaviour’ (Peters, 
1999: 95). It is not the intention to review these studies but merely to note, 
before examining studies consciously framed by ‘new institutional’ approaches, 
that an older established institutionalist tradition has continued to produce 
empirical studies designed to test propositions derived from theory. But these 
studies do not fit neatly into a categorization of ‘new institutional’ studies. 
 
Institutionalization 
 
The first question to be addressed in this chapter is: how do institutions become 
institutions? One answer provided by theories of ‘institutionalization’ is 
through a longitudinal process of development. The focus of ‘institutionalization’ 
is thus upon organizational transition over time. In this sense, as Guy 
Peters points out in his introductory chapter to this volume, it is a ‘process 
theory’ which moves beyond the specification of a dichotomous variable – either 
an institution exists or it does not, to a continuous variable – whereby an 
institution can be more or less institutionalized. But if institutionalization is 
conceived in this latter sense then the specification of independent variables 
and measurement of the degree of institutionalization become crucial to the 
understanding of the process. The essence of the argument presented here, 
however, is that both specification and measurement have been deficient in the 
study of the institutionalization of legislatures. 
 
Institutionalization: conceptualization 
 
Samuel Huntington provides a classic definition of institutionalization as ‘the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’ 
(1968: 12). For Huntington institutions themselves are ‘stable, valued, recurring 
patterns of behaviour’, and institutionalized organizations are defined by 
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their adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence (1968: 12). By identifying 
common criteria and measures, Huntington believed it would be possible 
to perform comparative analyses of institutionalization in political systems 
generally and in political organizations specifically. The same belief has 
driven subsequent studies of institutionalization in legislatures. What this chapter 
argues, however, is that the comparative potential of the concept of institutionalization 
has been limited by a failure to use common criteria and measures 
of institutionalization. In fact, other than in agreeing that institutionalization 
is a process whereby legislatures develop discrete modes of internal organization 
which help to differentiate them from their political environment, there is 
little agreement as to exactly what its defining core characteristics are. As a 
corollary, given the differences over how an institutionalized legislature is conceptualized, 
there are corresponding differences in the variables deployed 
to measure the level of institutionalization. In other words, legislative studies 
have tended to hold different conceptions and use different measures of the 
process of institutionalization. 
 
Conceptual variety has been apparent from the outset. Polsby’s seminal 1968 
article, which provided the first detailed empirical study of institutionalization 
in legislatures, while citing Huntington, chose not to use his specified four criteria. 
Indeed, Polsby did not advance a formal conceptualization of the process 
at all, offering instead three characteristics of institutionalization. An institutionalized 
organization for Polsby was: first, relatively well differentiated from 
its environment; second, internally complex; and, third, operated in accordance 
with universalistic and automatic decision-making processes (1968: 145). Subsequent 
studies have either been side-tracked by Polsby’s partial stipulation of 
the characteristics of legislative institutionalization, or have had to abandon 
Polsby’s characterization and develop other definitions of institutionalization. 
For example, Loewenberg and Patterson (1979: 22) identify two defining criteria 
of institutionalization – ‘habitual behaviour’ and ‘organisational complexity’. 
Yet Patterson, writing later with Copeland (1994: 4), defined an institutionalized 
legislature in terms of four criteria: autonomy, formality, uniformity, 
and complexity. Philip Norton (1998a: 8) reduces the ‘basic features’ of 
institutionalization to ‘regularity’ (in terms of rules and behaviour) and ‘structural 
specificity’. In contrast, Sisson (1973) provides a more complex 
conceptualization which seeks to explain the internal organizational development 
of legislatures in terms of their environmental adaptation. The relationship 
between external environment and internal organization is analysed 
through three indices: the structural, the cultural, and the character of compliance 
(1973: 25). In turn, the structural indices are subdivided into two categories 
– institutional autonomy and organizational complexity – and these are 
then linked to the representative functions of legislatures and a capacity for 
self-regeneration (1973: 29). 
 
From this brief survey it can be seen that while there is agreement that 
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institutionalization is a process of internal organizational development and 
external differentiation, there is little agreement as to exactly what its defining 
core characteristics are. Even if any particular definition was to be adopted 
there is little indication in existing studies as to the priority and ranking of 
criteria within each conceptualization. As will be demonstrated in this chapter’s 
review of institutionalization studies, there is no indication as to whether each 
variable carries equal weight and is equally important for conceptualization; 
or whether there is a hierarchy of variables; or, alternatively, if there is a single 
core criterion without which institutionalization does not occur. 
 
A further problem arises in the absence of agreement as to what constitutes 
the end point of institutionalization – what a ‘fully’ institutionalized legislature 
looks like. In Huntington’s classic conceptualization organizational adaptability 
and longevity are the hallmarks of a highly institutionalized organization. 
‘The more adaptable an organization … the more highly institutionalized 
it is … the longer an institution has been in existence, the higher the level of 
institutionalization’ (Huntington, 1968: 13). Similarly, Patterson and Copeland 
identify representative institutions as being particularly prone to frequent organizational 
change. For them ‘legislatures or parliaments may be highly adaptive 
institutions’ (1994: 7). In contrast, however, Loewenberg and Patterson 
(1979: 21) maintain that ‘a highly institutionalized legislature has organizational 
inertia’. 
 
From the outset, therefore, it needs to be recognized that institutionalization 
is a general concept illuminating a process of institutional change, but one 
that has great difficulty in specifying what the end point of the process is and 
whether there are common processes at work. 
 
Institutionalization: measurement 
 
Given the differences over conceptualization, it is not surprising to find that 
there are corresponding differences in the specification of independent variables 
and the measures of institutionalization. An inherent problem of Polsby’s 
pioneering approach was that, although the characteristics ascribed to an institutionalized 
legislature were deemed to be universal in nature, the variables 
used to measure the extent of institutionalization were largely specific to a particular 
type of legislature – the US Congress. As is widely acknowledged, however, 
the US Congress is not a ‘typical’ legislature. In fact, Polsby (1975) was 
crucially aware of the distinction between ‘arena’ and ‘transformative’ legislatures 
– having made the analytical distinction himself. Nonetheless, the criteria 
deployed in his study of legislative ‘institutionalization’ were appropriate 
essentially for a particular type of legislature – the transformative variant. 
 
Transformative legislatures are characterized by their ‘independent capacity, 
frequently exercised, to mold and transform proposals from whatever sources 
into law’ (Polsby, 1975: 277). In contrast to the study of arena legislatures, the 
 120 
 
focus of analytical attention for students of transformative legislatures, Polsby 
believes, are internal structures and institutional norms. In the discussion of 
institutionalization this focus finds reflection in Polsby’s concentration upon 
committee structures, appointment processes, institutional socialization processes, 
regulation of interests, rules of procedure and customs such as seniority. 
Measures of institutionalization in the US Congress, a transformative legislature, 
are not necessarily the most appropriate measures of institutionalization 
in ‘arena’ legislatures. The latter ‘serve as formalized settings for the interplay 
of significant political forces in the life of a political system’ (Polsby, 1975: 
277). In these legislatures the function of ‘lawmaking’ is not their exclusive 
preserve and the locus of decision-making may be indeterminate – and, in fact, 
may extend to party systems or political executives beyond the organizational 
bounds of legislatures. What is of particular significance to the discussion here, 
however, is that the concept of an ‘arena’ legislature recognizes the linkage between 
external social forces – constituted variously as parties, social classes, 
functional groups, or electors – and internal procedures of legislatures. As Polsby 
(1975: 285) acknowledged: ‘the identification of a legislature as an arena points 
the scholar away from the detailed examination of the legislature per se and 
toward the study of outside institutions such as party or stratification systems’. 
 
Nelson Polsby: the institutionalization of the US Congress 
 
In essence Polsby was engaged in a comparative study – a cross-time comparison 
of the organizational structure of a single institution. The empirical measures 
used to determine the degree of institutionalization at any point in time 
were: first, boundedness; second, complexity; and, third, automicity of internal 
decision-making. ‘Boundedness’ was measured primarily in terms of career 
opportunities; with stability of membership and the professionalization 
and persistence of House leadership roles used as indicators of increased institutionalization. 
The second variable – the growth of internal complexity – was 
harder to quantify. Polsby proceeded, therefore, to measure the development 
of internal complexity in terms of the growth in the autonomy and importance 
of committees, in the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership 
and in the provision of allowances, accommodation, staff and back-up facilities. 
The measures of the growth of internal complexity were, by Polsby’s own 
admission, based upon an ‘anecdotal accounting procedure’ (1968: 153) and 
‘weak’ indicators (1968: 160). Similarly the move from discretionary toward 
automatic decision-making, as measured in terms of the development of committee 
seniority and the settlement of contested elections on merit, was again 
partly based upon anecdotal evidence and the ‘testimony of a number of quotes’. 
On the basis of this less than robust data Polsby concluded that ‘one of the 
main long-run changes in the US House of Representatives has been toward 
greater institutionalization’ (1968: 164). Indeed, it is worth noting at this point 
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that Polsby’s initial purpose was to describe in what sense the House was an 
institutionalized organization. Only when he had established the degree of institutionalization 
did Polsby then proceed to offer ‘a number of speculative 
observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be drawn from 
the institutionalization of the House’ (1968: 144). In so doing he raised three 
questions: ‘What caused it? What follows from it? What can this case tell us 
about the process in general?’ (1968: 164). 
 
In the event, however, the answers proved illusive to Polsby who could offer 
little more than ‘theoretical guesses’. The first guess was that institutionalization 
was correlated with institutional size and increased workload. Polsby based 
this guess on the notion of ‘density’ and the idea that as the responsibilities of 
national government grew then the agencies of national government institutionalized. 
Equally, as national government institutions grew in size so the organizational 
necessity increased for a division of labour and for rules and precedents 
to structure modes of internal working. 
 
The tentative answer to the second question was provided in four parts. 
First, there was a partial displacement of goals, with, for example, legislators’ 
personal goals focused upon maximization of status and power rather than the 
enhancement of public policies. Second, the development of specialization 
enhanced the policy influence of both legislators and the legislature. Third, 
decentralization of power within the House increased the attractiveness of service 
therein. Fourth, institutionalization promoted professional internal norms 
(1968: 166). 
 
As for the third question, the answer was pitched at the high level of generality 
that hierarchical structures are not a necessary feature of the institutionalization 
process. 
 
Problems with Polsby 
 
A major advantage of Polsby’s study is that it is comparative and, in its attempt 
to explain the House of Representatives in different time periods, it seeks to 
understand and develop wider hypotheses about institutional change. In explaining 
change over time, Polsby directs attention to exogenous as well as endogenous 
factors. But he does so only partially and tentatively. For example, he 
reduces the analysis of boundedness to the question of whether boundaries are 
open or closed, and uses tenure patterns as the primary measure of closed 
boundaries. In so doing he narrows the consideration of the impact of external 
factors to one closely specified variable. In measuring boundedness exclusively 
in terms of personnel differentiation, Polsby measures the impact of external 
factors through a single facet of linkage. Other elements of ‘boundedness’, such 
as the existence of a distinct normative system or internal managerial autonomy, 
are thus ignored in the concentration upon Congressional tenure patterns 
(Rosenthal, 1996: 186). 
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Similarly, when Polsby analyses the consequences of complexity he does so 
by treating the House of Representatives as a ‘a closed system in all regards 
because of its degree of closure in a single regard [career patterns]’ (Cooper 
and Brady, 1981: 997). Moreover, Polsby largely side-steps the analysis of the 
relationship between internal structural variables and external factors by focusing 
exclusively upon ‘complexity’ and reducing other structural features – 
specialization, centralization and formalism – to the status of ‘consequences’ 
of institutionalization. The result is that ‘because of Polsby’s assumptions regarding 
system closure and his focus upon complexity and universal norms as 
the prime internal variables, his approach cannot deal with the range of structural 
variation that actually exists’ (Cooper and Brady, 1981: 997). 
 
Indeed, in their general review of diachronic analyses of Congress, and in a 
specific critique of Polsby’s article on institutionalization, Cooper and Brady 
(1981) conclude that the primary independent variables explaining structural 
change within Congress over time are environmental. They identify four categories 
of variables to be of crucial importance: the scope and complexity of 
demands for legislative outputs; the nature of executive roles and resources; 
the character of the electoral and party systems; and the impact of ‘aspects of 
democratic values that define the more precise content of broad values, such as 
majority rule, equality, openness’ (Cooper and Brady 1981: 998). According to 
Cooper and Brady it is these external variables which provide the impetus for 
institutional change. Although the actual relationship between institutional 
change and environmental context is exceedingly complex, nonetheless, they 
are convinced that ‘structural change can be conceptualized, operationalized, 
and explained in terms of an organization theory approach which emphasizes 
external determinants and organizational needs’ (Cooper and Brady, 1981: 998). 
What needs to be remembered, however, is that legislatures are embedded in 
wider representative processes of elections, constituency linkages and wider 
systemic relations with executives, bureaucracies, and organized interests. These 
external variables provide powerful constraints upon internal organization. ‘As 
a consequence [legislatures are] not free to accommodate [their] organizational 
needs through the variety of structural arrangements that are open or possible 
in other organizational contexts’ (1981: 997). 
 
Institutionalization in comparative perspective 
 
In Polsby’s formulation at least, the concept of ‘institutionalization’ fails to provide 
causal or relational propositions. One consequence is that his analysis provides 
no conceptual framework for explaining or predicting change. Hence, 
even within the specific context of the US Congress, Polsby’s approach is of 
limited value in explaining change across time. Both conceptualization and 
measurement of institutionalization are tied to a particular institution and to 
‘particular historical circumstances whose determinants and interrelationships 
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remain unspecified’ (Cooper and Brady 1981: 997). Hence, if Polsby’s seminal 
study of legislative institutionalization is deficient even in the context of the 
US Congress, then expectations might not be high that it would provide suitable 
conceptualization and appropriate variables for comparative analysis. 
Nonetheless, such low expectations have failed to dissuade analysts from undertaking 
comparative studies of institutionalization using Polsby’s 
conceptualization and variables. 
 
While there is a ritual of paying tribute to Polsby’s pioneering study and 
acknowledging its utility in providing a starting point of analysis, it becomes 
apparent fairly rapidly that his conceptualization does not travel well. Even 
within the US political system, at state level, successive legislative analysts have 
encountered difficulties in operationalizing Polsby’s conceptualization and 
measures. Squire’s study of institutionalization in the Californian Assembly 
found that Polsby’s criteria had to be modified considerably if the concept was 
to retain its utility (1992). ‘Boundedness’ had to be qualified to take account of 
the high turnover rate of Californian Assembly members. ‘Complexity’ was 
quantified by an array of measures, but only one – number of committees – 
corresponded to Polsby’s initial measure. Similarly, Polsby’s notion of ‘universalistic’ 
decision-making, as evidenced in a seniority system, had little resonance 
in the Californian state legislature (Squire, 1992: 1046). 
 
Indeed, a broader study of state legislative development, concluded that ‘if 
the test of institutionalization is that it is susceptible to quantification and that 
measures are available which are faithful to the concept, then institutionalization 
has limited applicability to state legislatures’ (Rosenthal, 1996: 185). Although 
Rosenthal maintains that ‘with some modification the concept can lend 
powerful support to explanations of current trends in state legislatures’, it is 
only by ditching Polsby’s initial formulation that he can sustain this argument. 
The dismembering of Polsby’s conceptualization is apparent in Rosenthal’s statement 
that: 
 
Legislative bodies can become institutionalized without adopting universalistic 
standards or establishing seniority systems. Nor has complexity been conceptually 
justified as a major dimension of institutionalization, and the indicators employed 
to measure it provide little meaning for the term. The difference between more 
and less institutionalized bodies is not, even in part, a difference in the number, 
authority, or specialization of committees or of other legislative agencies. 
Universalism and complexity work neither in theory nor in practice as indicators 
of institutionalization in state legislatures. (1996: 185) 
 
All that is left of relevance is thus the notion of ‘boundedness’ which 
Rosenthal identifies as the conceptual core of institutionalization. But even 
here Polsby’s idea of legislative boundedness is seen to have been too narrowly 
conceived (Rosenthal, 1996: 186). The idea of a ‘conceptual core’ of institutionalization 
will be examined later in this chapter, but for now attention will 
be focused upon how well the concept has travelled beyond the USA. 
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The short answer is that Polsby’s formulation has not travelled well. Successive 
comparative studies of legislatures have encountered significant difficulties 
in trying to operationalize the concept of institutionalization. One of the 
earliest attempts, an edited volume by Kornberg (1973), sought to structure its 
contributions around the theme of institutionalization. From the outset, however, 
the editor had to concede ‘failure’. Kornberg sought to explain the inability 
of his contributors to focus their analyses upon institutionalization as ‘a 
function of the lack of scholarly agreement on even a nominal definition of 
that concept’ (1973: 1–2). 
 
Similarly, Patterson and Copeland (1994: 9) in their comparative study asked 
their contributors to appraise the institutionalization of legislatures, and to 
analyse ‘contemporary pressure for organizational change and the resulting 
adaptations of these assemblies’. They identified institutionalization as a process, 
and clearly subscribed to the view that parliaments ‘become institutions’ 
(1994: 3). An institution in their view is ‘by definition, an organization that has 
been around quite a while; it has a life history’ (1994: 3). There was a partial 
echo of the characteristics identified by Polsby in that a highly institutionalized 
legislature ‘exhibits autonomy, formality, uniformity and complexity’ (1994: 
4). Also in line with Polsby, Patterson and Copeland believed that the concept 
refers to ‘the phenomenon of the regularity of collective behaviour’ and involves 
‘establishing and maintaining organizational structures, and linking the 
organization to its environment’ (1994: 4). While recognizing that legislatures 
are embedded in their environments, and in this sense they are ‘constituent 
institutions’, the environment is closely defined in terms of the exhibition of 
‘congeries of linkages to geographical and other constituencies’ (1994: 6). In 
this formulation, however, the environment is no longer an independent variable 
(or set of variables) explaining institutional change and internal organizational 
adaptation. The crucial research question is lost and replaced by the maxim 
that ‘[i]nstitutionalized organizations are organizations that work’ (1994: 152). 
 
In asking their contributors ‘to think about the degree to which the parliament 
in their study is institutionalized’, Copeland and Patterson eschewed ‘strict 
frameworks or operational definitions’, nor did they identify ‘a checklist for 
institutionalization’ (1994: viii). As a result, the questions of how and why institutions 
change are posed, but never systematically addressed or answered. 
Notably, only one chapter makes explicit, but fleeting, reference to Polsby’s 
criteria and seeks to operationalize his measures of institutionalization (Hibbing 
and Patterson, 1994: 147–9). Most other chapters simply ignore Polsby. 
 
Even when Polsby’s indicators are deployed in a comparative context they 
can lead to the conclusion that an established and stable organization, ‘that has 
been around quite a while’, namely the British House of Commons, turns out 
to be ‘not very institutionalized’ (Hibbing, 1988: 707). Although Hibbing’s study 
of the British parliament identifies ‘many elements of the evolution of the Commons 
[which] are consistent with those predicted by the concept of 
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institutionalization’, even so he concedes that the evidence is ‘spotty’ (1988: 
707). ‘Some trends predicted by institutionalization are not as evident as others. 
Other trends simply do not occur at all, and still others exhibit frequent 
reversals of direction’ (1988: 707). This leads Hibbing to ask the question: ‘What 
does all this mean for the ability of institutionalization to act as a model of 
legislative change?’ His answer is that such a model is ‘gross at best; it illustrates 
a general tendency, but with facets that fall victim to politics at particular moments’ 
(1988: 708). 
 
In reaching this conclusion Hibbing proposes that the way forward is ‘to 
pose and attempt to answer questions regarding the nature of the relationship 
between legislative change and the environment within which the legislative 
change is evolving’ (1988: 708). Exactly the same proposition was made earlier 
by Polsby and reiterated more forcefully by Cooper and Brady. In the end, however, 
Hibbing laments: 
 
no-one has undertaken the work of empirically relating measures of 
environmental change to indicators of legislative change … Instead we are treated 
to pleasant stories regarding how some specific events in the history of legislatures 
can be seen as responses to occurrences in the larger polity. These stories are 
nearly always plausible, but they also tend to sound extremely post hoc. (1988: 
710) 
 
Institutionalization and democratization in new legislatures 
 
‘Story telling’ continues to characterize the study of institutionalization in the 
newly emergent parliaments in East and Central Europe (ECE) after 1989. The 
edited volume of Olson and Norton (1996) which examined ten legislatures in 
transition, discerned ‘a process of institutionalization’ and could point to ‘a 
degree of institutionalization’ in each of the new parliaments. The measures 
used to reach this conclusion were professionalism, staff, resources and the formal 
division of labour as evidenced in the use of committees. The editors identified 
that ‘we can thus see institutional development taking place, and we would 
expect this to continue’ (1996: 239). But there was little attempt to utilize the 
variables identified by Polsby to collect systematic data across all ten legislatures, 
or to relate internal organizational characteristics to external variables. 
The emphasis of the volume was primarily upon description. 
 
At one level such a descriptive approach is understandable given the newness 
of both the institutions and of the political science profession in ECE. 
There were, however, notable attempts to break out of this descriptive orthodoxy. 
Thus, for example, Simon (1996) undertook a diachronic analysis of the 
Polish Sejm at three time points (pre-1989, 1989–91, and 1991–93) to identify 
a process of institutionalization. Importantly, Simon looks beyond the Sejm to 
examine the ‘opportunity structure’ provided by the changing environment of 
Polish politics during the initial post-communist period. External political 
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variables are identified – especially the emergence of a competitive electoral 
process and a multi-party system and the development of a hybrid presidential– 
parliamentary constitution. Equally, a time-comparative assessment of the 
internal organizational development of the Sejm is undertaken. In essence, 
therefore, Simon poses the standard questions about the relationship between 
legislative change and the wider environmental context within which such 
change occurs. Once again, however, the actual linkage is left untested empirically. 
 
Similarly, Crowther and Roper (1996) in their comparative study of institutional 
development in the Romanian and Moldovan legislatures are sensitive 
to the external variables which impact upon the internal organizational development 
of legislatures. In noting the distinctly different patterns of evolution 
of the two legislatures in the relatively short period since the breakdown of the 
communist regimes in 1989–90, Crowther and Roper (1996: 155–6), point to 
the importance of ‘institutional inheritance’, the ‘general policy environment’. 
They reach the conclusion that while neither legislature is highly institutionalized 
the Romanian legislature had achieved ‘a greater degree of institutionalization 
than its counterpart in Moldova’ (1996: 158). This conclusion was based 
largely upon qualitative data derived from legislators’ evaluations of the respective 
distribution of functions between the legislature and the government, 
and of the legislature as a democratic institution. The qualitative data was 
supplemented with data on levels of parliamentarians’ participation in legislative 
activities (1996: 155). The measures of institutionalization were thus different 
to those employed in other studies of institutionalization. Moreover, the 
data did not directly measure the impact of external variables upon internal 
structures and organization. Ultimately, therefore, Crowther and Roper have 
to concede that their data is merely ‘suggestive’ that ‘more research needs to be 
conducted’ (1996: 155). 
 
The most notable attempt to break from storytelling is provided in Kopecky’s 
(2001) Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. This book analyses the 
relationship between the concepts of institutionalization, democratic transition 
and consolidation in two post-communist political systems. From a preliminary 
review of the ‘analytical issues related to the institutionalization of 
parliament’ Kopecky (2001: 13) draws a distinction between the ‘direction’ and 
‘degree’ of institutionalization. The former focuses attention upon formal internal 
structures and organization, while the latter ‘directs attention to the capacity 
of parliament to reproduce itself and to resist social intervention’ (2001: 
14) Of particular significance in Kopecky’s study is the exploration of the connection 
between internal organizational development and changes in a 
legislature’s external environment. 
 
Kopecky provides an impressively detailed analysis of the development of 
the origins of the Czech and Slovak parliaments, the impact of electoral systems 
and the role of political parties, the nature of executive–legislative relations 
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and the organization and behaviour of political parties. While making the case 
that institutionalization has to be understood in the interconnection of external 
and internal dimensions, and that both should be studied simultaneously 
‘so as to capture the implications of the external relationship for the dynamic 
of parliament’s internal development and vice versa’ (2001: 207), hypotheses 
about the direction and degree of institutionalization remain largely unformulated. 
Ultimately, institutionalization is still conceived by Kopecky as a single 
process that is ‘long-term’ and can be ‘completed at some point’ (2001: 15). In 
the end, despite his best endeavours, Kopecky concedes the need ‘for better 
conceptual tools to reveal the complexity of interactions between structures, 
institutions and agents’ (2001: 240). 
 
In Parliaments in Asia, Norton (1998b: 191) also maintains that more scholarly 
attention should be paid to institutionalization and to parliaments generally 
in Asia. Norton adopts a narrow conception of institutionalization as ‘regularity’ 
and ‘structural specificity’, and concludes that all parliaments in the seven country 
survey are autonomous in that they are free-standing institutions, but 
the extent to which they can exercise power is limited by the control exercised 
by party groups. All experience high levels of membership turnover. All have 
developed some form of a committee system as a crucial element of structural 
specificity. Ultimately the conclusions are reached: first, that ‘though parliaments 
are developing institutionally they lack some of the features of institutionalized 
legislatures’; and, second, that though the parliaments ‘are not highly 
institutionalized, they are clearly more institutionalized than they were’ (1998b: 
190). Unfortunately, what remains unstated is how levels of institutionalization 
are quantified and categorized. 
 
Legislative institutionalization: more research! 
 
The call for ‘more research’ is endemic to writings on legislative ‘institutionalization’. 
What current research reveals is that legislative institutionalization is 
neither ‘some uniform, monotonic, and homogenizing process’ (Hibbing, 1988: 
707) nor is it a ‘unidirectional and finite process’ (Longley, 1996: 23). Future 
research, therefore, might profit from a conceptual distinction between ‘becoming’ 
an institution (boundedness) and ‘being’ an institution in terms of 
internal organizational structures and the development of institutional norms. 
This distinction is already implicit within some analyses. For example, one of 
the goals of Copeland and Patterson was to understand how legislatures ‘become 
institutionalized, and how they continue to change once they are institutionalized’ 
(1994: viii). This distinction could be made more explicit in a separation 
of measures of ‘becoming’ from measures of ‘being’ – with the latter 
focused upon analysing institutional change. 
 
Moreover, it would help the process of conceptualization if an explicit 
acknowledgement was made that ‘institutionalization is a subspecies of 
organization theory’ (Hibbing, 1999: 156). As a general theory, 
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 institutionalization is of value in explaining how institutions become organized and how 
they become differentiated from other political organizations, but equally other 
organization theories (dealing with specialization, professionalization, procedural 
rules, normative development, etc.) might more usefully be deployed to 
explain institutional change thereafter. The utilization of different organization 
theories would avoid the ambiguities associated with a single process of 
‘institutionalization’ and the converse process of ‘deinstitutionalization’. Instead, 
legislatures could be conceived as more, or less, specialized in terms of an internal 
division of labour; or more or less ‘professionalized’ in terms of membership 
characteristics and performance of legislative roles; or more or less 
routinized in terms of rules of procedure; or more or less structured by 
behavioural norms. Different processes, different time periods and differing 
constitutional contexts would allow for differentiated assessments of internal 
organization and so reduce expectations that there is a single uniform trajectory 
of ‘institutionalization’, or that there is some ineluctable process whereby 
legislatures can become ‘fully’ institutionalized. If this was accepted then ‘legislative 
institutionalization itself should not be expected to be identical across 
legislatures in different political systems’ (Hibbing, 1999: 162). 
 
The logic of this argument identifies ‘boundedness’ as the conceptual core 
of institutionalization (in agreement with Rosenthal 1996: 189). But 
boundedness, as defined by Polsby, in terms of the differentiation of personnel, 
is insufficient in itself, and is certainly inappropriate in other non- 
Congressional legislative systems. To take one obvious example, highlighted by 
Hibbing (1999: 158),‘[o]nce we move outside the US it becomes virtually impossible 
to consider institutionalization without considering parties’. In turn, 
the reason why parties limit institutionalization (as measured using the variables 
identified for transformative legislatures) is because of the different constitutional 
context within which they operate. ‘Boundedness’ is inhibited in 
parliamentary systems by the intrusion of pronounced party competition, party 
organizations and hierarchies. Moreover, where party leadership roles are conjoined 
with executive hierarchies, as in Westminster systems, then the constitutional 
design of those systems mitigates against boundedness and the autonomy 
of legislatures as defined by Polsby. In this sense they would be prevented, 
in Polsby’s terms at least, from becoming ‘fully institutionalised’. In 
fact, as Campbell (1977: 129) notes, the initial choice of Congress as a model of 
institutionalization has resulted in most of the world’s legislatures being ‘set 
up … for failure’. 
 
Nonetheless, the establishment of boundaries remains of crucial importance 
to the concept but needs to be redefined to include legislatures which have a 
reasonable degree of autonomy and which have been able to establish themselves 
as relatively permanent and viable parts of the wider political system. 
Moreover, as Hibbing (1999: 161) notes, the very essence of legislatures as 
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representative institutions constitutes an inherent limitation upon the trajectory 
of institutionalization. In his words: ‘If institutionalization is the process 
of an organization isolating itself from its environment … legislatures are simply 
unable to go very far down the road of institutionalization’ (1999: 161–2). 
In identifying ‘boundedness’ as the conceptual core of institutionalization 
an implicit assumption is made that in the process of establishing definitive 
boundaries an institution becomes ‘an institution’. The contours of a legislature’s 
environmental boundaries may vary from one political system to another, most 
obviously from presidential to parliamentary systems. Nonetheless, the ability 
to demarcate boundaries – to develop ‘boundedness’ in Polsby’s terms, or ‘autonomy’ 
in Huntington’s terminology – leads to an analytical concern with 
exactly how, why and when an institution achieves distinctive boundaries. This 
is akin to Ragsdale and Theis’s (1997: 1284) notion of an ‘external’ process of 
institutionalization. 
 
In addition Ragsdale and Theis identify an ‘internal’ institutionalization 
process which reveals ‘how the organization’s structures and procedures establish 
stable relationships and a unique identity among its units and staffs’ (1997: 
1284). Such an ‘internal’ focus would draw attention to Huntington’s notions 
of ‘complexity’ and ‘coherence’ and upon Polsby’s variables of ‘complexity’ and 
‘automicity’. In making this distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ processes 
of institutionalization the orthodoxy of institutionalization as a singular 
process is challenged, and recognition is afforded to two serial processes of, 
first, ‘becoming an institution’, and, second, ‘becoming a more organisationally 
complex institution’. If this distinction is made then institutional change can 
be conceptualized, operationalized, and explained from the analytical perspective 
of organization theories rather than from a single undifferentiated theory 
of ‘institutionalization’. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
 
If institutionalization is a theory concerned with how and why legislatures become 
institutions, then most rational choice perspectives are concerned to explain 
why, within particular institutional frames, legislators go about their business 
in particular ways and with what effects. The key advantage of rational 
choice approaches is that they offer ‘clear and refutable statements about what 
is expected to happen, under what circumstances, and why’ (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel, 1994: 211). In reducing propositions to restricted ‘stylized facts’, however, 
rational choice models are open to the accusation that they are ‘unrealistic’ 
and fail to capture the complexities associated with the ‘real world’ of legislatures. 
A main disadvantage is that rational choice approaches are prone to 
generate over-simplified models which require complex statistical manipulations 
to validate their relatively simple propositions. The danger is that ‘tedious 
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claims about legislative politics asserted from the rational choice perspective 
… [may] provoke fruitless and empty, if statistically elegant, empirical enquiries’ 
(Patterson, 1995: 23). The following section examines these advantages 
and disadvantages by reviewing some of the major rational choice studies of 
the US Congress and of the European Parliament. However, the intention here 
is not to review the diversity of rational choice analyses, but, instead, to focus 
attention more narrowly upon models of internal legislative organization and 
of the choice of legislative procedures. 
 
By way of introduction, however, it should be noted that rational choice 
institutionalists are united in their objective of discovering the importance of 
institutions in channelling and controlling individual behaviour (Peters, 1999: 
44). If institutions shape behaviour and outcomes, then some explanation is 
required of how they are created and sustained by rational actors. Hence, rational 
choice institutionalists seek to locate the utility-maximizing decisions of 
individuals within an institutional context. Institutions determine the behaviour 
of individuals who in turn produce political outcomes (Saalfeld, 1995: 48). In 
this manner it is believed that formal institutional arrangements influence legislative 
processes. However, the exact nature of adaptation and of the interactions 
between individuals, institutions and outcomes varies amongst rational 
choice perspectives. 
 
US congressional organization and rational choice theories 
 
Although rational choice theories have been applied to a range of legislatures 
(see for example, Döring, 1995; Huber, 1996; Döring and Hallerberg, 2004), it 
remains the case that most theorizing and empirical testing of rational choice 
theories has focused upon the US Congress. Indeed, instrumental rationality 
has been the ‘theoretical engine’ driving the study of Congress in recent years 
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 149). What is important for present purposes is 
that at the core of seemingly disparate theories is a logic which holds that institutions 
represent solutions to particular forms of transaction problems. In essence, 
each theory maintains that ‘institutions provide the means by which 
cooperation dividends [for their members] are captured’ (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1994: 166). 
 
In reviewing formal models of legislative institutions (or more accurately 
Congress as an institution) Shepsle and Weingast (1994: 146) identified three 
main categories of rationales or explanations which underpinned studies of 
congressional organization and decision-making over a period of two decades. 
These are informational, partisan and organizational rationales. All three models 
examine in their different ways the interaction of individual actors and institutional 
structures, and, in part, the differences among the theories can be explained 
as theoretical responses to the changing institution of Congress itself. 
All three also were responses to the initial lack of attention paid to institutional 
constraints in first-generation rational choice models. 
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In this first generation, the works of Fenno (1973) on committees, Mayhew 
(1974) on the electoral connection, and Fiorina (1974) on roll-call voting, drew 
upon the insights offered by rational choice theories. The emphasis of the early 
studies was upon distributive policies and how legislators secured favourable 
distributions through exchange and concerted action. Theories of distribution 
are essentially individualistic in focus and identify the principal task of a legislature 
as the allocation of policy benefits. In these theories the institutional 
structure, the procedures and the internal organization of Congress featured 
only tangentially. The first-generation formal models, in the words of Shepsle 
and Weingast, were ‘institutionally sparse’ (1994: 151). Moreover, these early 
models were also couched at a level of abstraction which made it difficult to 
relate them to the real world of congressional politics. 
 
In response to this institutional myopia, second-generation theorists in the 
early 1980s sought to locate the actions of self-interested individuals within 
the constraints of institutional structures. They sought a theoretical perspective 
which could accommodate institutional features approximating to the 
operations of Congress itself. While the focus was still upon distributive politics, 
institutional arrangements were identified as exogenous variables with 
which to explain legislators’ strategic interactions. Distribution was now set in 
the context of multiple jurisdictions and heterogeneous political interests. In 
particular, it was assumed that policies of concern to some representatives would 
be of little interest to others. But, as Fiorina (1987: 338) contends, ‘if opportunities 
to make the same sorts of trades are expected to occur repeatedly, transactions 
costs can be cut by institutionalizing the trades’. The logic of exchange 
and cooperation was that institutional solutions had to be discovered to cope 
with the need for exchange and the trading of influence. 
 
In the second-generation models the committee system was identified as 
the institutional solution which secured the necessary exchanges and bargains. 
The logic was that legislative organization revolved around committees because 
this institutional form helped to fulfill individual legislator’s distributive 
goals. The dominant concern was with who received benefits from legislative 
policy choices and at whose expense. The question asked about legislative institutions 
was subsequently, how can institutional design assist legislators capture 
gains from trade? 
 
While drawing upon the logic of exchange and cooperation, third-generation 
models treated institutional structures as endogenous variables and provided 
alternative rationales for the internal organization of Congress and institutional 
practices. These alternative rationales – informational, partisan and 
organizational – are those identified by Shepsle and Weingast (1994). 
 
a) Informational rationales 
The foundations of informational theories, like distributional theories, are 
rooted in individualistic axioms: ‘The key to understanding the creation and 
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maintenance of legislatures that perform well lies in harnessing self-interest’ 
(Krehbiel, 1991: 264). But the difference between the two sets of theories is to 
be found in the exact status of institutional arrangements in the legislative 
process. 
 
For informational theorists, such as Krehbiel (1991), the creation and maintenance 
of institutional form is endogenous. In particular, committees are conceived 
as more than distributional devices based on a division-of-labour. They 
are also ‘specialization-of-labour devices’ (Krehbiel, 1991: 80). Hence, a key 
difference from a distributional perspective is that ‘committee types, rules, and 
resources arise from within informational models because of the constitutional 
provision that the legislature determines the rules of its proceedings’ (1991: 
80). Institutional arrangements reflect a need to acquire and disseminate information. 
Rules are seen as informational devices that are chosen by the legislature 
to maximize the organizational effects of committees (1991: 191). In 
turn, committees with special powers provide incentives for legislators to specialize 
in order to achieve their political goals. The ultimate challenge of legislative 
institutions, therefore, is to secure gains from specialization while minimizing 
the degree to which enacted policies deviate from majority-preferred 
outcomes. In short, Krehbiel’s argument is that uncertainty of policy outcomes 
engenders institutional arrangements that reward expertise and specialization. 
 
b) Partisan rationales 
While ‘informational’ models emphasize the organizational logic behind the 
creation and maintenance of a strong committee system, they do so without 
direct reference to parties. As Cox and McCubbins (1993: 6) note, these theories 
have ‘a committee system and a House, but no parties’. 
 
In Legislative Leviathan (1993), Cox and McCubbins seek to redress this 
imbalance through a re-evaluation of the role of committees in a partisan context. 
Their contention is that parties are intentionally designed in order to solve 
collective dilemmas confronting legislators. These collective dilemmas are ‘situations 
in which the rational but unorganized action of group members may 
lead to an outcome that all consider worse than outcomes attainable by organized 
action’ (Cox and McCubbins, 1993: 84). The ‘solution’ is organizational 
in ‘the creation of leadership posts that are both attractive and elective’ (1993: 
84). In essence, congressional parties are conceived of as a species of legislative 
cartel, which endow their members with differential power and facilitate and 
stabilize legislative trades which benefit their members (1993: 278). The primary 
purpose of the cartels is to secure the control of the legislative agenda for 
its members. In Setting the Agenda (2005) Cox and McCubbins further develop 
‘procedural cartel theory’ and examine more broadly the basic contention that 
parties seek to exert control over the legislative agenda rather than controlling 
votes. In institutional terms ‘[a]genda power is delegated to offices, and the 
governing coalition takes most of these offices; however the occupants of those 
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offices are then free to act as they please’ (2005: 11). In the US House of Representatives 
the main agenda-setting offices are the committee chairs, membership 
of the Rules Committee and the Speakership. 
 
In asserting control of the agenda the majority party seeks to exercise control 
over legislative organization to ensure that institutional design maximizes 
the gains of legislative outputs for its members. Again this is a reassertion of 
the point common to most rational choice institutionalist perspectives: that 
institutional solutions are devised to deal with collective dilemmas, externalities 
and public goods issues. But variables such as committee composition and 
leadership power, which are exogenous in second-generation models, are treated 
as endogenous in Cox and McCubbins’s model. 
 
c) Organizational rationale 
Explicit recognition of the importance of institutional creation and design to 
individual choice is also found in the ‘organizational’ approach associated with 
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), and Lupia and McCubbins (1994; 1998). For 
Kiewiet and McCubbins’s legislative committees constitute one dimension of 
principal-agent relationships. From the dual observations that Congress has 
delegated significant authority to its committees and subcommittees, and that 
parties exert a strong and systematic influence upon national policy-making, 
Kiewiet and McCubbins construct a theory which seeks to link delegation to 
partisan politics. Their focus is on how organizational bases of collective action 
revolve around nested principal-agent relationships. The essence of Kiewiet 
and McCubbins’s argument is that parties have successfully managed the delegation 
of authority both inside Congress and beyond (1991: 222). Congressional 
parties thus use delegation to pursue their policy objectives (1991: 234). 
Institutional design reflects ‘delegation designed to aid congressional parties in 
pursuing their policy goals’ (1991: 184). 
 
McCubbins in his joint work with Lupia (1994; 1998) revisits the ‘agency 
problem’ inherent in delegation. The focus of McCubbins’s attention is redirected 
back to the informational rationale and explores the conditions under 
which legislators can learn about the actions of experts. Using principal-agent 
theory Lupia and McCubbins seek to explain ‘how legislators can realize the 
potential benefits of delegation without abdicating their control over policy’ 
(1994: 368). An essential ingredient of their explanation is that ‘[l]egislative 
rules, procedures, and practices, though created for other purposes, often establish 
the conditions for learning’ (1994: 369). In which case, ‘much of the 
scholarship which concludes that legislatures are powerless has missed the implication 
of procedures and practices that entail the payment of observable 
opportunity costs: these institutions enable learning’ (1994: 369). Institutional 
design becomes the key, therefore, to the existence of competition between 
information providers. 
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Rational choice simplifications and the ‘real world’ 
 
Clearly the reality of the House of Representatives is that it is organized around 
parties and committees and involves information exchange and delegation 
among representatives. Yet rational choice theories are prone to the criticisms 
that their assumptions are unduly restricted and overly simple. Thus, for example, 
Krehbiel’s informational model can be criticized for postulating a unidimensional 
policy space, for omitting parties and the impact of congressional 
leaders (see Krehbiel, 1991: 260–1). Correspondingly, Cox and McCubbins’s 
assumption of representativeness of party contingents on committees has led 
to the accusation that ‘their treatment of the manner in which individual party 
members’ preferences are aggregated into a collective partisan view is not satisfactory’ 
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 170–1). Cox and McCubbins’s (1997: 1386) 
assumption that decreasing party homogeneity leads to institutional powers 
for majority party leaders, while increasing homogeneity will lead to greater 
institutional powers fails to match the complexity of Congressional politics 
(Schickler and Rich, 1997: 1372). Equally, Lupia and McCubbins’s reduction of 
a legislature to a unitary actor is a conceptual over-simplification. They assume 
that ‘legislators’ preferences, legislators’ abilities, and the legislature’s structural 
characteristics have already interacted to produce a single-peaked legislative 
utility function’ (1994: 379). For ‘expositional simplicity’ they also assume 
that both agent and principal are completely informed about maintaining the 
existing policy but that only the agent is completely informed about the consequences 
of the principal’s decision to accept the proposal. 
 
Moreover, rational choice perspectives have a tendency to plough increasingly 
deep but still narrow furrows as the internal logic of each model is refined 
in the light of criticisms from other perspectives. Other criticisms are 
that it often proves difficult to operationalize the causal variables identified by 
each approach, and the studies are often time specific and fail to develop quantitative 
measures of change in key variables over time (Schickler, 2000: 271). 
Nonetheless, deficiencies of modelling and conceptualization in rational 
choice models of legislative organization have a positive by-product in prompting 
subsequent theoretical refinements and further empirical testing. Thus from 
a recognition that ‘it is not parties or committees that are consequential in Congress, 
but often parties and committees’, Aldrich proceeds to develop ‘a model 
of a legislature which is organized by parties and into committees’ (Aldrich, 
1994: 314; 335). Yet, while acknowledging this interconnection, Aldrich’s own 
model still bases its propositions on ‘an idealized account of the US House of 
Representatives’ (1994: 326) and one that is ultimately applied only to the ‘simplest 
of agendas’ (1994: 335). Similarly, to take one further example only, Baron 
(2000) refines Krehbiel’s (1991) and Gilligan and Kriehbiels’ (1990) signalling 
model of internal legislative organization by adding a ‘screening stage’. The 
resultant ‘legislative screening model’ (Baron, 2000: 487–90) proposes that the 
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legislature chooses an arrangement to govern the work of a committee before 
it begins its legislative work (2000: 486). On this basis Baron makes seven predictions 
of informational theories of legislative organization (2000: 502–3). 
Whether Baron’s predictions are necessarily dependent upon his elaborate 
modelling is a moot point. Sceptics might contend, for example, that 12 pages 
of statistical notation are not actually required to predict, among other things, 
that ‘less information is transmitted and the floor is worse off the greater the 
preference divergence’ (2000: 502). 
 
There is no question, however, that rational choice studies of Congressional 
organization have amassed impressive amounts of empirical data. Undoubtedly, 
rational choice theorists are masters at analysing substantial and impressive 
varieties and quantities of data. The ‘empirical success’ of rational choice 
perspectives is one of the positive benefits brought to the study of Congressional 
organization (Miller, 2000: 537). Equally, it is evident from the studies 
mentioned above that submitting propositions derived from theory to empirical 
validation is at the heart of rational choice analysis. Unfortunately, if rational 
choice models have the advantages of theoretical clarity and parsimony, 
they also have the disadvantages of over-reductionism and a desiccated approach 
to political phenomena. Thus, for those who do not count themselves among the 
‘true believers’ of rational choice ‘sometimes the rational choice lingo and formalization 
are more an interruption than illuminating’ (Patterson, 1994: 467). 
 
Rational choice: EU legislative processes and inter-institutional 
Bargaining 
 
In reviewing the development of theories of European integration since the 
1990s Mark Pollack (2005: 358) noted that many scholars had come to view 
the European Union (EU) as ‘analytically more similar to the US political system 
than to other international organizations’. Certainly, in the case of the European 
Parliament, the US House of Representatives was identified as a more 
appropriate comparator than other parliamentary institutions in EU member 
states (Kreppel, 2006: 245; Shackleton, 2005: 138). It was perhaps unsurprising, 
therefore, that the formal models that had provided the ‘theoretical engine’ for 
studies of the US Congress came to be deployed in the study of the European 
Parliament (EP). These models (or what Pollack calls ‘off-the-shelf theories of 
legislative politics’ (Pollack, 2005: 374)) provided potentially powerful analytical 
lenses through which legislative behaviour and organization within the EP, 
and the EP’s broader interinstitutional interactions, could be viewed and understood. 
As Simon Hix (2005: 76) acknowledged: ‘three generations of institutional 
rational choice research [in the USA] … help us to understand how 
the EU legislative process works’. The implicit question raised in this statement, 
however, is just how ‘good a fit’ are these ‘off-the-peg’ theories to the 
shape and contours of the EP’s institutional form? 
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Off-the-peg theories 
 
Procedural spatial models 
 
With the significant increments in powers that accompanied successive treaty 
revisions after the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), the European Parliament 
attracted increasing attention from political scientists. US political scientists 
were particularly noticeable in surfing the early waves of analysis into the growing 
powers of the EP. One pre-eminent ‘surfer’, George Tsebelis, was explicit in 
his acknowledgement that ‘my approach is part of a series of studies that attempts 
to apply the institutional approach developed through the study of 
American politics to the institutions of the community’ (1994: 128). Many of 
these early studies drew directly upon spatial models that had been used extensively 
in the US. 
 
Procedural spatial models revolve around two central concepts: veto power 
and agenda-setting power. They analyse the effects of institutions and procedures 
on policy choices and formulate conclusions on equilibrium policies on 
the basis of the preferences of political actors and the location of the status 
quo. Veto power enables an actor to block any decision and hence his/her preferences 
cannot be discarded. Veto power will not be used if the proposed legislation 
is closer to the preferences of the actor with such power than otherwise 
would be the case. Agenda-setting power is dependent upon the configuration 
of actors’ preferences and the location of the current policy – the status quo. As 
Tsebelis (1994: 131) notes, agenda-setting power is when an actor can make it 
‘impossible, difficult, or costly for decision makers to modify their proposals’. 
Without outlining the complexities of the conditional agenda-setting model, 
the essence of Tsebelis’s position was that under the cooperation procedure, 
introduced by the SEA, the EP was able to exercise considerable legislative power 
because the Council found it easier to accept a proposal from Parliament, if the 
Commission also accepted it, because acceptance required a qualified majority 
but amendment required unanimity in the Council. Throughout successive 
studies Tsebelis maintained that the EP’s conditional agenda-setting power 
under cooperation was far from trivial (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 14). 
 
However, other spatial analysts questioned Tsebelis’s proposition that the 
EP had agenda-setting powers. Crombez (1996: 201), for example, used comparative 
spatial models of three EU legislative procedures (consultation, cooperation 
and assent) to argue that while the EP gained a significant veto power 
under the cooperation procedure – as it had the capacity to reject a Council 
common position (1996: 219) – it did not ‘enjoy agenda-setting power’ (1996: 
220). Similarly, Moser disputed Tsebelis’s model and concluded that under the 
cooperation procedure the EP had only limited powers and that these were 
derived from ‘conditional veto rights’ rather than a conditional agenda-setting 
capacity (Moser 1996: 838; 1997). According to Moser it was the Commission 
that remained the decisive agenda setter rather than the EP, and that in ‘most cases 
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the EP [could] only beg the Commission and Council to reconsider’ (1996: 837). 
 
The introduction of the codecision-I procedure in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
simply served to widen the differences between the proponents of rational 
models. Nonetheless, Tsebelis et al. (2001: 579) resolutely maintained that ‘the 
conditional agenda-setting powers provided by the co-operation procedure is 
more important for parliamentary influence on policy-making than the absolute 
veto power provided to the Parliament by the co-decision procedure’ (see 
also Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996; 1997; 2000). Whereas under cooperation the 
EP was able to select the compromize closest to its ideal point, under codecision- 
I selection was delegated to the Council. The Council was thus an unconstrained 
agenda-setter under the new procedure (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000: 23). 
 
This claim brought Tsebelis and Garrett into conflict with other analysts 
using spatial models. Crombez (1999: 22; 2000: 36), for instance, was in no 
doubts that the EP had become ‘a genuine co-legislature equal in stature to the 
Council’. For Scully (1997: 65), Tsebelis and Garrett’s findings were ‘invalid 
even within the logic of [their] own model’ primarily because they failed to 
take into account the bargains reached at earlier stages of the legislative process. 
In response, Tsebelis and Garrett invoked the notion of ‘backward induction’ 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997: 80). In essence, this meant that the Council 
could foresee what would happen at each stage of the procedure and so adopt 
a stance at the outset at the first reading. Or, in Tsebelis and Garrett’s words, 
‘rational actors … strategize “backwards” from the end of a game-tree to the 
beginning’ (1997: 80). While in game theory the logic of backward induction 
might be ‘impeachable’, one-play extensive form games are rarely encountered 
‘in real life’ (Dowding, 2000: 131). Certainly, the bargaining processes between 
Council and EP did not constitute a single game but rather represented ‘a series 
of games over many issues, and bargaining in one game will affect moves 
in other games’ (see Dowding, 2000: 131). 
 
Ultimately ‘[d]espite the elegance and complexity of these models, the “findings” 
are still conjectures which might not be empirically true’ (Steunenberg, 
2000: 368). In turn, such conjectures are conditioned by the assumptions built 
into each model (see Rittberger, 2000: 568–70). From the outset, whether the 
entire codecision procedure, or only the last two stages of the procedure, are 
included in the model has a significant impact upon the predictions of each 
model. Equally, predictions are affected by the choice of assumptions: one dimensional 
versus n-dimensional spatial models; complete versus imperfect 
information; one-shot versus iterated games; and two unitary institutional actors 
versus one single player (EP) and a non-unitary actor (Council). 
 
The difficulty for most scholars outside of the rational choice school was in 
determining which, if any, of the models was of most utility in understanding 
the EP’s contribution to the EU’s legislative process. Not the least of the problems 
in making such an assessment was how such models could be compared if 
they started from different assumptions and led to different conjectures. As 
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Dowding (2000: 139) notes: ‘a model which differs from another in two assumptions 
differs by one assumption too much, if one really wants to compare 
them’. Indeed, Selk (2004a: 85) reached the conclusion that: ‘currently there 
exists no model for which it could legitimately be claimed that it represents a 
better characterization of the European Union’s legislative process than some 
other model does’. 
 
Under codecision-II, the procedure as modified by the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty, the various proponents of procedural spatial models at least agreed that 
the EP had become a co-legislator with the Council, and that a ‘truly bicameral’ 
system had come into being (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000: 15; Garrett and Tsebelis, 
2001: 372; Crombez, 2000: 365). While Tsebelis and Garrett were unwilling to 
renounce their views on codecision-I they recognized that the EP under 
codecision-II had become ‘unambiguously more powerful than it was under 
cooperation’ (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000: 11). The reason adduced by Tsebelis 
and Garrett was that the Council could no longer overrule the EP and that the 
two institutions bargained on an equal footing with no a priori bargaining 
advantage inhering to either institution. Crombez (2000: 35) on the other hand 
concluded that codecision-II ‘in some case may lead to a loss of power for the 
Parliament, insofar as the Parliament has preferences close to the Commission’s 
and little bargaining powers compared to the Council’. 
 
By the start of the twenty-first century there was, therefore, agreement 
amongst spatial theorists that the codecision-II represented an increase in the 
legislative powers of the EP. But beyond this limited consensus little could be 
explained without significant refinement of the models’ assumptions and notions 
of preferences. Plenty of possible refinements were on offer. Bueno de 
Mesquita (2004: 131), for example, provided a broad critique of models that 
assumed ‘policy ideal points’ and suggested refinements that would allow ‘estimates 
of the feasible range of ideal points for individual decision-makers’. It 
has also been acknowledged that, if spatial models were to be developed, assumptions 
that the EP was a unitary actor with fixed preferences encompassing 
all policy fields would have to be refined. What was needed was a ‘better 
understanding of preference formation and aggregation [that] would help us 
to abandon the hitherto static and over-generalized statements about the policy 
preferences of the Council, the Commission and the EP’ (Hörl et al., 2005: 
596). Similarly, the conceptualization of ‘dimensionality’ also required refinement. 
One-dimensional assumptions, where preferences were seen to be distributed 
on one- dimensional integration continuum, came to be supplemented 
in turn by an ideological dimension (see for example Hix et al., 2006: Chapter 
9) and by multi-dimensional ‘choice space’ where preferences are also allocated 
along ideological and institutional dimensions (see Rittberger, 2000: 557–8). 
Further refinements were also proposed to the dimensions of conflict and issue 
space (see Selk, 2004b). While there might be some intrinsic value in refining 
formal models, there was still the danger, however, as Hörl et al. (2005: 
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593) contended, that theoretical development had ‘reached a point of stagnation’. 
 
Legislative organization and parties 
 
Spatial models have also underpinned several major analyses of voting decisions 
within the European Parliament. One major concern of these studies has 
been with the role of parties in solving collective action problems for elected 
representatives. Cohesive parties in legislatures are viewed as reducing the dimensionality 
of legislative politics and increasing the predictability of legislative 
decisions. What rational choice theories seek to explain, therefore, is why 
cohesion emerges, how it is sustained and what are its effects. 
 
Kreppel’s (2002) examination of the institutional evolution of the EP, and 
of the supranational party system within it, builds its theoretical framework 
upon ‘existing American models of congressional development’ (2002: 5). Two 
models were borrowed from the USA: a ‘macro model’, which is rooted in 
Polsby’s notion of ‘institutionalization’; and an adapted ‘micro model’ that posits 
that legislators act in purposive ways to fulfil specific goals in accordance with 
individual preferences. Kreppel maintained that the two models taken together 
‘prove extremely helpful in predicting the timing and character of the evolution 
of the internal organizational structures of the EP and the development of 
the supranational party group system’ (Kreppel, 2002: 213). The danger, however, 
is that the models, in combination, become all encompassing. Indeed, in 
seeking to modify them ‘to allow their application beyond the American congressional 
context’ (2002: 213) the difficulty arizes that the predictive statements 
become so vague, and their generalisability so generic, that the connection 
between specific theory and empirical findings derived from the EP is 
diluted. Undoubtedly, Kreppel’s detailed empirical analysis added greatly to 
the understanding of the development of the EP; but the contribution to the 
development of rational choice analysis was less certain. This was apparent in 
Kreppel’s belief that ‘the following predictive statement can generalize the basic 
concept of this body of work’: 
 
Political actors … will attempt to shape the institutions in which they work to 
maximize their ability to achieve their goals. Their action will be constrained by 
and reflect both the rules within the institution and the broader political 
environment. (Kreppel, 2002: 214) 
 
Far more rigorous examination of a variety of formal theories – principalagent; 
agenda cartel theory of parties; coalition formation; and spatial analysis 
of dimensionality – has been undertaken in the copious works of Simon Hix, 
Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland (see as a representative sample Hix, 2001, 
2002, 2004; Noury, 2004; Noury and Roland, 2002; Hix et al., 2006). Hix and 
colleagues tested perspectives on party formation and party cohesion against 
the roll-call voting behaviour of MEPs in nearly 15,000 recorded votes in the 
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first five elected parliaments between 1979 and 2004. Their findings revealed 
that left-right politics explained the overwhelming proportion of roll-call votes 
in the EP, that party cohesion had increased as the powers of the EP increased 
and that coalitions between parties occurred primarily along ideological lines. 
Hix et al. concluded that parties in the EP ‘solve internal collective action problems 
within the legislature, in order to increase the predictability of voting patterns, 
reduce the dimensionality of politics, enhance the quality of legislation 
by adequate specialization and more efficient and comprehensive provision of 
public goods’ (Hix et al., 2007: 216). 
 
Committees 
 
Rational choice perspectives – of informational, partisan and organizational 
rationales of legislative organization – have all been deployed in the analysis of 
the EP’s committees. Whitaker (2005: 24), for example, concluded that his analysis 
of roll-call votes in the first year of the 1999 parliament produced findings 
that were consistent both with an informational perspective and a modified 
form of Cox and McCubbins’s partisan selection model. In essence Whitaker’s 
study demonstrated that the roll-call voting behaviour of committee members 
was largely representative of their national party delegations. While locating 
his analysis within rational choice perspectives, Whitaker conceded that his 
findings also support ‘a simple and intuitive view of legislative politics in the 
EU: as the EP’s actions matter more, so national parties are more concerned 
with what their MEPs do’ (2005: 25). 
 
McElroy (2006: 9–10) located her analysis of the representativeness of committee 
membership in the EP within the debate between distributional and 
informational approaches to the organizational logic of committees. On the 
basis of an analysis of roll-call votes in the 1999–2004 parliament she concluded 
that committees were basically representative of the EP as a whole in 
partisan, national and ideological terms. While recognizing that the analysis 
was only the first step in examining the committee system McElroy (2006: 26) 
was sufficiently sure of her results to suggest that ‘the assignment process in the 
European Parliament is more consonant with the informational model of politics’. 
Hoyland (2006) approached the study of the allocation of codecision reports 
amongst party representatives in the EP’s committees from the rational 
choice perspective of a ‘signalling game with more than one sender’ (Hoyland, 
2006: 33). The model was based upon two institutions bargaining in a one dimensional 
policy space and with responsibility for proposing a new policy 
delegated to a sender in both institutions. The model then sought to identify 
the incentives of senders to be involved in the process. Empirical investigation 
of the allocation of codecision reports between 1999 and 2003 revealed that 
party size, shared policy preferences, and whether an MEP is from a ‘governing 
party’ were related to the allocation of reports (2006: 44). 
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Simplified models, the European Parliament and the real World 
 
As a deductive method, rational choice uses simplified models to help conceptualize 
how actors might behave and then to test these assumptions empirically. 
Certainly, rational choice perspectives on the EP have been subject to a 
number of criticisms. The first is simply to state that on the basis of available 
evidence a particular formal model is ‘wrong’. The contested assumptions of 
rational choice modeling have been noted above, but such modelling is also 
prone to accusations that there is a basic misinterpretation of the procedures 
under scrutiny. Scully (1997: 59), for example, criticized Tsebelis and Garrett’s 
understanding of the codecision-I for being ‘incomplete and seriously flawed’. 
More specifically, Burns (2004: 5; 2006: 234–5), highlighted the ‘incorrect claims’ 
made by Tsebelis and Garrett with regard to the position of the Commission 
under codecision-I; and deemed Crombez’s claims about Commission proposals 
under codecision-II ‘inaccurate’ (2004: 14). Indeed, practitioners have 
been particularly dismissive of formal modelling, with a former Chair of the 
EP’s Environment Committee observing: ‘I do not know anybody who is involved 
in this business: from the Council side, in the Commission, or in the 
Parliament, who would argue [Tsebelis and Garrett’s] case’ (Ken Collins, MEP 
quoted in Wurzel, 1999: 5). Similarly, another MEP, Richard Corbett (2000: 3), 
notes that Tsebelis and Garrett’s view of codecision-I was ‘the opposite of the 
opinion of almost every practitioner – politicians and officials alike’. Indeed, 
Corbett raised broader doubts about the value of rational choice modelling given 
that ‘much of the empirical evidence flies in the face of … theory’ (Corbett, 2000: 
373; see also Corbett, 2001: 361–4). In other words, there was a perceived mismatch 
between rational choice theory and the ‘real world’ of EU decision making. 
 
The restricted horizons of rational choice analysts and their exclusion of 
informal dimensions of decision-making from formal models also attracted 
criticism (see Corbett, 2000: 377; Judge and Earnshaw, 2003: 284). Subsequently, 
attempts have been made to build upon the assumptions of game theory by 
taking into account informal institutions and how they affect equilibrium selection 
(Farrell and Héritier, 2003). In doing so, however, what defines such an 
approach as ‘game theoretic’ and why it remains ‘rational choice’ is brought 
into to question; especially when the authors admit that ‘our account has some 
similarities with recent work from neofunctionalist … and historical institutionalist 
perspectives’ (Farrell and Héritier, 2003: 595; see also Judge and 
Earnshaw, 2003: 291–2). Similarly, much of the testing of the formal models of 
the organizational form of committees in the EP is prone to the same criticism 
that has been levelled against rational choice more generally: ‘at best, [it has] 
been used to restate what everyone already knows in a language few can understand 
and, at worst, that it has propagated entirely bogus explanations’ 
(Hindmoor, 2006: 1). 
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Mantra: more data 
 
Formal models have undoubtedly brought a ‘paradigm shift’ in the study of the 
EP and engendered a ‘revolution’ generally in the study of EU institutions (Pahre, 
2005: 114). Given this shift, and with the danger of ever decreasing increments 
of utility stemming from theoretical refinements, the focus of academic attention 
has moved to empirical investigations. Ironically, the paucity of empirical 
data was one of the reasons ascribed in the first instance for the dominance of 
‘an overtly theoretical approach’ and ‘an inability to move beyond general theoretical 
arguments about procedure’ (Kreppel, 2002: 785; see also Garrett and 
Tsebelis, 2001: 361). Increasingly a need was articulated for the collection of 
empirical data to test the predictive capacity of differing models, or to evaluate 
model comparability, or to test the goodness of fit between model and actual 
decision-making processes. Exactly what kind of data should be collected, and 
the significance of different types of data for model ‘testing’, remained open to 
dispute (see Steunenberg, 2000: 369–70; Pahre, 2005). What was not in dispute, 
however, was the need for more data (see Dowding, 2000: 13; Steunenberg, 
2000: 369–70; Rittberger, 2000: 570; Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001: 361; Beuno de 
Mesquita, 2004: 136; Selck, 2004a: 85; Hörl et al., 2005: 602–3). Yet, the collection 
of more data, in itself, did not address the extant deficiencies of formal 
models – with their simplicities and stylized representations of decisionmaking. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalists posit a far more complex world than do rational 
choice theorists. In the words of Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 702) historical 
institutionalism has ‘macroscopic inclinations’. As such it is interested in ‘interaction 
effects’ and ‘overarching contexts’ (2002: 711) rather than in individual level 
behaviour or micro-processes evident in some variants of rational choice. 
At the heart of historical institutionalism is historically-grounded analysis. 
According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 695–6), historical institutionalism 
has three recurrent characteristics: first, a focus on explaining important or 
puzzling events or arrangements; second, a concern with overarching social 
context; and, third, the tracing of historical processes. 
 
A notable feature of historical institutionalism has been a concern with power 
and the asymmetrical mediation of power relations through institutions (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 940–1). In particular, this approach has been attentive to the 
relationship between institutions and ideas and beliefs (1996: 942). A unifying 
feature of different characterizations of historical institutionalism is the belief 
that institutions alone are not the only causal force in politics. Whether this 
constitutes a ‘theoretically and methodologically coherent genre’, as Pierson 
and Skocpol maintain (2002: 693), remains an open question. 
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In the study of legislatures there has been a keen understanding of the importance 
of history, but often in a descriptive or narrative tradition (see Polsby, 
2004). What has been less in evidence, however, is theorization with a historical 
dimension of legislative institutions. Certainly there has been widespread 
agreement that ‘institutions simply cannot be properly understood uprooted 
from their historical evolution’ (Patterson, 1995: 14). From this perspective 
‘inquiry across time is inevitable and indispensable for assembling knowledge 
about legislative origins and purpose’ (1995: 25). What is required, therefore, is 
‘fresh theorising and more determined deployment of historical data … to give us 
a firmer purchase on institutional design, development and change’ (1995: 25). 
In tune with this plea, attempts have been made to theorize the emergence 
of representative institutions in terms of their bargaining over the taxation 
powers of rulers. This is a central theme of Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, 
and European States (1992). Tilly’s argument is that rulers, in pursuit of money 
to finance their wars, struck bargains with their subjects in which they conceded 
a parliament in exchange for tax revenues (1992: 64). Tilly’s work however 
might just as easily be located in the ‘sociological’ stream of institutional 
theory (see Peters, 1999: 97–111) as it is primarily concerned with the variation 
in state-form and development over a period of a thousand years, rather 
than with the analysis of legislatures as such. Similarly, Moore (2004) uses a 
core causal model to explain differences in state-forms in terms of variations 
of the sources of state revenues. This encompasses analyses of the institutionalization 
of the fiscal authority of the western parliaments (2004: 299–304) 
which are then used to clarify comparative historical explanations of state development 
beyond Western Europe and to examine contemporary policy options. 
While a macro-historical paradigm is offered and the language of ‘path 
dependence’ (2004: 311) is deployed, Moore prefers to locate his approach within 
a ‘fiscal sociology paradigm’. 
 
Robert Bates (1991) provides a more focused analysis of the relationship 
between economics and the politics of democratization. As part of this analysis 
he notes that ‘even a casual reading of the literature on the origins of parliaments 
reveals that these institutions arose as arenas in which monarchs bargained 
with citizens over taxes’ (1991: 24). For Bates the nature of the economy, 
and in particular the nature of the tax base, strongly shaped the terms of the 
bargain between revenue-seeking monarchs and asset-owning citizens over 
securing representation and the creation of a parliament. 
 
An explicit bargaining model of the development of parliaments is developed 
by Herb (1999). In this model, the ruler, after bargaining, trades a parliament 
for revenue. The collective action problem identified by Herb is the overcoming 
of potential barriers to establishing mutually binding commitments in 
such a trade. Chief among these is free-riding by taxpayers. If no sanction exists, 
few or no taxes will be collected and any bargain between taxpayers and 
the ruler will fail. Herb’s answer is that the historical link between taxation and 
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parliaments is to be found in the role ascribed to the latter in assessing and 
collecting taxes. Representative institutions solved the problem of free-riding 
for the ruler and explain the bargaining power, in terms of taxation, that these 
institutions enjoyed against rulers. Specifically, what Herb’s analysis points to 
is a qualitative difference in the role of taxation as the source of parliamentary 
power between the pre-absolutist period and post-absolutist period. In the 
former period the power of parliaments developed out of their influence over 
tax collection, in the later period new parliaments did not control the tax collection 
machinery. In other words, the origins of modern parliaments in the 
past two centuries have to be sought somewhere other than in taxation. 
 
The value of Herb’s historical institutionalist approach is that it attempts to 
theorize the origins of parliaments. The problem is that, in attempting to impose 
a single ‘sparse theory of bargaining’ (Herb, 1999: 15), other explanatory 
variables – such as socio-economic conflicts, military interventions, elite restructuring 
– are overlooked and remain untested. This raizes a general problem 
with historical institutional approaches of identifying causality and of choice 
of independent variables. One issue concerns ‘selection of dependent variable’ 
– whereby one institution is identified at the centre of analysis and then a historical 
account is constructed around the focal institution. Equally, to start 
analysis from a suspicion that ‘causal variables of interest will be strongly influenced 
by overarching cultural, institutional, and/or epochal contexts’ (Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2002: 711) does not help to identify which contextual variables 
should be used for measurement. Ultimately, as Gorges (2001: 141) notes, ‘while 
[the] acknowledgement of the complex nature of causality is laudable, it does 
make it difficult to disprove new institutionalist arguments or sort out the complex 
combinations of institutional and non-institutional variables that determine 
outcomes’. 
 
Most of the works examined above, although concerned with legislatures 
do not necessarily have these representative institutions at the centre of their 
analytical attention. This deficiency was acknowledged by Katznelson and 
Lapinski (2006) who called for ‘a turn to Congress’ which would ‘emplace Congress 
at the center of research’ (2006: 251). Although Katznelson and Lapinski’s 
point of departure was from the perspective of the academic subfield of ‘American 
Political Development’ (APD), they located APD within the ‘larger family 
of Historical Institutionalism’ (2006: 244) and understood institutions to be: 
 
Implanted within historical dynamics and processes, often large-scale and transindividual, 
which shape their development. In turn, both individual and collective 
actors are set within these institutions that powerfully shape and constrain 
preference behaviour. (2006: 245) 
 
In calling for ‘a turn to Congress’ and linking this with studies of policy substance 
Katznelson and Lapinski (2006: 245) believed that such an approach 
provided the chance to make better connections between structure and agency. 
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In turn, these connections would enable researchers ‘to treat legislative institutional 
arrangements as hinges joining matters of structure and agency together; 
and to link this enriched analysis to the biggest and most changing questions 
about the character of the American polity and its history of change, resistance, 
and transformation’. 
 
These words resonate with the ‘macroscopic inclinations’, ‘interaction effects’ 
and ‘overarching contexts’ identified by Pierson and Skocpol as some of 
the key characteristics of historical institutionalism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The simple question posed at the start of this chapter was: how useful is an 
‘institutional’ approach to the study of legislatures? Certainly, the study of political 
institutions should be ‘part of the tool kit of every political scientist’ 
(Rhodes, 1997: 64). Traditionally, legislative scholars have retained institutional 
analysis as a vital part of their studies. However, just as no craftsman expects to 
use a single, universal tool to accomplish diverse mechanical tasks, so too political 
scientists should not expect a single unified theory to explain the origins 
and organizational development of all institutions. The basic contention of all 
institutional theories is that institutions matter. Beyond that simple consensus, 
however, creative tensions are apparent in explanations of why institutions 
matter. 
 
Competing institutional approaches have had to recognize the nature of 
conceptual divergence and to respond to different empirical findings. As a result, 
some analytical convergence has occurred, and analytical syntheses have 
been sought (see for an overview Katznelson and Weingast, 2005), but conceptual 
conflict and empirical disputation is still embedded within ‘new’ institutionalism. 
This dynamic has been apparent within all the approaches reviewed 
here, but has been most pronounced in rational choice institutionalism. For 
instance, in the study of Congress the respective advocates of informational, 
partisan and organizational rationales have used conceptual differentiation as 
a means of maintaining their respective analytical integrity. Similarly, the study 
of the European Parliament has been enlivened and enhanced by internecine 
disputes among rational choice scholars. Correspondingly, students of ‘institutionalization’ 
have generated sufficient internal contestation to render external 
criticism almost superfluous. 
 
In addition, proponents of any particular approach have also had to respond 
to the external interrogation of their assumptions. Thus, the parsimony of rational 
choice modelling is open to the accusation that it has been achieved by 
using propositions with only a tangential connection with the ‘real world’ of 
legislatures. Whereas rational choice theorists counter that the proclivity of 
historical institutionalists ‘to develop hypotheses more inductively, in the course 
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of interpreting the empirical material itself ’ is ‘inelegant and atheoretical’ 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12). ‘Storytelling’ is still a charge, therefore, which 
haunts historical institutionalists, particularly when they are unwilling, or unable, 
to disentangle causal variables in their macro-analyses of ‘path dependencies’ 
and of ‘timing and sequencing’. 
 
Out of disputation, however, certain commonalities and positive analytical 
syntheses have emerged within ‘new’ institutionalism. Thus, for example, rational 
choice scholars now recognize the advantages of testing multiple competing 
models, rather than restrictive testing of single models. Eric Schickler 
(2000) provides one notable example in his comparison of competing rational 
choice models of legislative organization – party cartel, conditional party government 
and ideological balance of power models. Equally noteworthy is the 
fact that Schickler’s study adds a historical dimension to the measurement of 
key variables by examining Congressional rule changes across a period of 132 
years. 
 
The argument here is not that there is inevitable synthetic dynamic at work 
within ‘new’ institutionalism. What it points to, instead, is the growing sophistication 
of ‘new’ institutionalist analyses. And at this stage in the discussion a 
predictable call for still further research would seem appropriate. Certainly, 
further analytical advance would be welcome, but a far simpler conclusion is 
offered here: ‘new’ institutional approaches should not, and cannot be ignored. 
‘Institutionalists’ (those who are neither ‘old’ nor ‘new’ – but who still believe 
in theoretically-informed empirical accumulations of knowledge – see for example 
Judge, 1981; 1990; 1993) and non-institutionalists may neither subscribe 
to, nor like, the variants of ‘new’ institutional theory reviewed here. Nonetheless, 
these theories need to be taken seriously and due acknowledgement should 
be made of their contributions to an understanding of the importance of legislatures 
as institutions. In this sense, the initial question posed in this chapter 
deserves a positive answer. 
 
Note 
The first section of this chapter was previously published as ‘Legislative Institutionalization: 
A Bent Analytical Arrow?’, Government and Opposition, 38: 4 (2003), 
497–516, and is reproduced here by kind permission of Blackwell Publishing. 
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